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INTRODUCHON
The United States military establishment is a significant polluter
of the air, land, and water.' The Cold War demanded enormous con-
sumption of resources so that weapons could be developed and mili-
tary dominance could be preserved.2 The Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines test weapons, build dams and roads, discharge toxic wastes,
create noise, and release pollutants into rivers and oceans and air.
The United States military is the most powerful and expensive mili-
tary force that has ever existed, and this environmental damage is one
of the by-products.3
One strategy employed by the citizens who want to protect the
environment and themselves is to sue the government under any one
of a number of environmental statutes. In some of these lawsuits, the
plaintiffs include claims that the military has violated their federal
constitutional rights. Yet the federal courts regularly and summarily
dismiss these constitutional claims. The prioritization of military
needs over environmental needs may benefit the military in the short
term while a particular weapon needs to be tested or personnel need
to be trained. In the longer term, however, all Americans are
harmed because the environment is itself a source of both health and
security.
This Comment examines how and why federal constitutional
claims fail when asserted by citizens in lawsuits against the United
* J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1998, Columbia Col-
lege, Columbia University. Thanks to Toby Stem, Jessica Songster, Carlos Montoya, and the
entire editorial staff of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for their guid-
ance and their hard work. Thanks also to ProfessorJason Johnston for his mentorship.
See STEPHEN DYCUS, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1996). This book is a
valuable source of background information on the issues of environmental protection, national
security, and their convergence.
2 Id.
3 See id. at 4.
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States military establishment. This Comment is broad in scope, sur-
veying federal cases in which citizens raise constitutional claims re-
garding various military actions. While not all of these plaintiffs were
motivated by their concern for the environment, environmental
damage was the result of military action in all of these cases and envi-
ronmental statutes provided the legal tools to stop the damage.
Some cases reach back thirty years, to the beginning of the modern
environmental movement. The scope is limited, however, to cases in
American courts over military activities occurring inside the territo-
rial United States. Therefore, the scope excludes the environmental
pollution that results from actual warfare.
Three factors make the potential conflicts between the military
and the environment increasingly relevant today. First, the current
Bush administration has been criticized by congressional Democrats,
nonprofit organizations, and other commentators not only for failing
to enforce our environmental laws,5 but also for rolling them back.6
Second, America's war on terrorism and the war with Iraq7 have
created a more militarized world, with more training, troop move-
ment, and weapons testing, all of which increase environmental deg-
radation. Today's weapons are more destructive and more countries
have them. National security has been at the forefront of the nation's
consciousness since September 11, 2001, and conventional wisdom
dictates that national security must clash with environmental protec-
tion goals. The memory of past terrorist attacks and the threat of fu-
ture ones render Americans willing to sacrifice the environment for
security, perhaps understandably.
Third, this is a time of heightened concern for the environment;
environmental ills are worsening" and environmental consciousness is
increasing.9 The environmental costs of nearly a half century of Cold
4 Note that the U.S. Department of Energy, not the Department of Defense, is responsible
for manufacturing and managing nuclear weapons, and is thereby excluded from this inquiry.
5 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Democrats See Slipping by G.O.P. on Environment, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2002, at A24; Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC"), The Bush Record at
http://www.nrdc.org/bushrecord/ (last modified Feb. 2, 2004). The NRDC is one of the most
effective environmental advocacy groups in the country.
6 See Stephen Dycus, Environmental Baby, Terrorism Bath Water, 19 ENVTL. F. 40, 45
(Sept./Oct. 2002).
See generally Michael R. Gordon, State of the Union: The Iraq Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003,
at Al; Eric Schmitt, Threats and Responses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A10.
8 For instance, the United Nations' Global Environmental Outlook 3 Report finds that de-
forestation continues, species are declining and going extinct, freshwater is under increasing
demand, oceans and coasts are degrading, urban consumption and waste output are up, and
environmental disasters are affecting more people. See UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK 3 (GEO-3) (2002) available at
http://www.grida.no/geo/geo3.
In a CBS News/New York Times Poll conducted in November 2002, sixty-two percent of
those polled thought that the federal government should be doing more to regulate the
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War preparations have come to light, and the public is less willing to
accept environmental costs that would have been accepted without
question in an earlier era.10
Part I of this Comment begins with a brief introduction to the
general relationship between the military and the environment, and
then takes up the analysis of federal cases in which citizens have sued
the military for environmental infractions under the Third and Fifth
Amendments in Part II. Part III provides a discussion of some of the
reasons why these constitutional claims fail. In Part IV the Comment
concludes that the courts commit a disservice to all citizens by disre-
garding their legitimate claims under the Bill of Rights, by both pri-
oritizing what the military claims it needs above the Constitution and
by allowing environmental degradation to continue unnecessarily.
I. THE MILITARY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The military establishment is subject to a panoply of environ-
mental statutes, which can be grouped into a handful of categories."
One category consists of planning statutes such as the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act ("NEPA")' and the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") , which require government agencies to consider the envi-
ronmental consequences of their actions. Another category consists
of prospective statutes such as the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 4 the
Clean Air Act ("CAA")," the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"),' 6 and the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"),' 7 which
seek to minimize or eliminate pollution before it is created. Finally,
there are retrospective statutes such as the Comprehensive
environmental practices of businesses, and fifty-seven percent of those polled thought that the
environment was so important that it should be protected regardless of the cost. See PollingRe-
port.com at http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
10 SeeDYCUS, supra note 1, at 1.
it See id. at 36 (describing different environmental statutes and what each regulates). As a
body of law, our nation's environmental statutes themselves are powerful and comprehensive.
The statutes only become weak through ineffective implementation and enforcement. See
Douglas T. Kendall et al., Conservative Judicial Activism and the Environment: An Assessment of the
Threat, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10835 (2002) (examining how conservative judicial activism under-
mines environmental protections).
12 National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4361 (2000). In short, NEPA is a
procedural statute that requires federal agencies to create an environmental impact state-
ment-a detailed report concerning a proposed program's environmental consequences-for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2) (C).
13 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
14 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
15 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (2000).
16 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (2000).
17 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
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Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("CERCLA"),"' which seek to clean up and restore the environment
after the damage has been done.'9
In order to comply with these and other environmental statutes,
the Defense of Department ("DoD") has a Deputy Under Secretary
for Environmental Security and an entire bureaucratic structure
complete with environmental audits, research and development, in-
sertion of environmental performance standards into procurement
contracts, training programs to impart environmental awareness to
military personnel, and public forums in which to discuss cleanup
plans.2  The DoD issues a "Report on Environmental Compliance"
every year, describing the environmental impacts of the various DoD
divisions.21 The DoD also spends between $2.5 and $3 billion on en-
vironmental compliance in the territorial United States alone.22
Despite the DoD's budgetary commitment to the environment,
the relationship between the military and the environment is an in-
herently tense one. One commentator notes a culture clash:
The two subject matter areas are characterized by radically different insti-
tutional and structural contexts. Whereas the national security field in-
volves a highly disciplined, largely secret enterprise mobilized behind
unitary goal-oriented missions, frequently beyond the reach of judicial
supervision, environmental policy has been made in a relatively transpar-
ent setting with a high degree of public consultation and input, with the
institution ofjudicial review playing a catalytic role.
This tension is most starkly expressed by the military's belief that en-
vironmental laws do not even apply in wartime.24 The military re-
quires victory at nearly any cost; the environment bears the burden of
that determination.
Yet, according to commentator Stephen Dycus, there is a rising
current of environmentalism in the military establishment, a realiza-
tion that environmental stewardship is part and parcel of national se-
curity, not an impediment to it.2' In 1990, then-Defense Secretary
Dick Cheney said that "[d]efense and the environment is not an ei-
ther/or proposition. To choose between them is impossible in this
18 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675 (2000).
19 For a discussion of all relevant environmental statutes, see generally DYCUS, supra note 1,
at 36-79.
20 See generally id. 74-79 (describing various DoD programs for compliance with environ-
mental laws).
21 See id. at 75.
22 Id.
23 David A. Wirth, At War with the Environment, 84 VA. L. REV. 315, 321 (1998) (reviewing
Dycus, supra note 1).
24 See DYcUS, supra note 1, at 9.
25 Id. at xiii.
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real world of serious defense threats and genuine environmental
concerns."6 Some Pentagon officials have expressed the same view,
pledging to repair past environmental wrongs and adhere to a stricter
code of environmental protection while protecting the country.
27
Yet the DoD's most recent authorization bill, sent to President
Bush on November 12, 2003, for his signature, 8 provided for military
exemptions from the ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
and the Pentagon is pushing this year for further exemptions from
the RCRA, CERCLA, and CAA.29
Nonetheless, the current Bush administration has taken an ei-
ther/or stance, prioritizing the struggle against the "Axis of Evil"
while rolling back the environmental protection victories of the last
thirty years.
Several environmental statutes provide a mechanism for citizens
and public interest groups to take enforcement into their own hands
when the government fails to enforce the law: the citizen suit.2 ' The
various citizen suit provisions allow citizens to sue to enforce the
terms of these statutes; indeed, Congress recognized that citizen en-
forcement would be necessary for the statutes to be effectively im-
plemented. There are simply too many statutes and too many
polluters for the federal and state environmental protection agencies
26 Id. at 2 (citing Richard B. Cheney, Address to the Defense and Environment Initiative Fo-
rum (Sept. 3, 1990)).
Id. (noting the commitment of some defense officials to learn from past mistakes and
treat environmental protection as a top priority).
28 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. 108-136, 117 Stat. 1639
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
29 Defense: Pentagon Will Return to Congress with Range Readiness; Wish List, GREENWIRE, Jan. 12,
2004, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Greenwire File.
30 See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, The War at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, § 4, at 8 (argu-
ing that the Bush administration's domestic agenda consists of starving the government of
funds for social programs and making the courts unfriendly to those who are not big busi-
nesses).
s1 The CWA's citizen suit provision is typical of environmental statutes:
§ 1365 Citizen Suits
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction.
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 1319 (g) (6) of this title,
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmen-
tal instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.
33 U.S.C § 1365(a) (2000). The statute also provides that the citizen may not file a citizen suit if
the Environmental Protection Agency Administrator or the state is already "diligently prosecut-
ing a civil or criminal action." Id. at § 1365(b).
2 See Dycus, supra note 1, at 164-65.
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to prosecute every case without the supplemental assistance of citi-
zens.
This Comment focuses strictly on the sliver of citizen suits that in-
clude a constitutional claim, and is further restricted to those suits in
which the court actually addressed the claim instead of dismissing the
suit for lack of Article III standing.3 These constitutional claims are
always made in conjunction with statutory claims, but the inverse is
not always true; most cases involving statutory claims do not include a
constitutional claim. As the following cases suggest, the rarity of
these constitutional claims might stem directly from their lack of suc-
cess in court.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CITIZENS' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. The Third Amendment
The citizen petitioners in Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garve 4
asked the Tenth Circuit to reverse orders from the Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") and the Air National Guard ("ANG,"), a
component of the United States Air Force, approving the Colorado
Airspace Initiative.35 The Initiative dictated the space for F-16 fighter
jets to train under realistic conditions, sometimes below an altitude of
500 feet.36 The court revealed its attitude towards the petitioners'
case in the early part of the opinion: "Petitioners raise an indiscrimi-
nate number of statutory and constitutional challenges to the ANG
and FAA decisions approving the Initiative.07 The citizens claimed
that the FAA had violated the Federal Aviation Act, FAA regulations,
and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"); that the ANG and the
FAA had violated NEPA and its implementing regulations; and that
the ANG and FAA had violated their Third and Fifth Amendment
rights.
38
The court provided twelve pages of reasoning to explain its find-
ings favoring the government on all statutory claims, and then turned
to the constitutional claims, spending only a few pa~es on its de novo
review of the Third and Fifth Amendment claims. 9 Regarding the
33 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2. The standing doctrine became a greater impediment to envi-
ronmental citizen suits with the Supreme Court's decision in two cases: Lujan v. National Wild-
life Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). The
issue of Article III standing merits its own investigation, so it is excluded here.
34 256 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2001).
35 Id. at 1027.
s6 Id. at 1028-29.
37 Id. at 1030.
18 Id.
39 Id. at 1041-44.
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Third Amendment 4° claim, the court began by stating that "Ij]udicial
interpretation of the Third Amendment is nearly nonexistent ....
Petitioners argue that '[b]ecause a private party has rights to the air-
space above his or her property... the United States military may not
appropriate such property interests during peacetime without the
property owners' consent.' This argument borders on frivolous."
41
Both the brevity of the court's analysis and the judge's condescending
language demonstrate that this argument had little chance of success
in this court. A less literal interpretation of the Third Amendment
could have led to a different outcome. Indeed, if the Third Amend-
ment is to be read this strictly, it loses all of its significance, because
unlike the British Redcoats who displaced colonial families from their
homes, modem soldiers have their own places to sleep. The court re-
fused to acknowledge that the loud noise from constant flyovers can
have the same disruptive effect as having a legion spend the night in
one's house.
In Custer County, the Tenth Circuit described and distinguished a
different case whose facts did not amount to frivolity. In Englbom v.
Carey,42 striking correction officers were moved out of their staff hous-
ing, without their consent, by New York State National Guardsmen
who were brought in to work their jobs during the strike.43 Finding
that the rooms in staff housing were the guards' homes, the Second
Circuit reversed the lower court's summary dismissal of the plaintiffs'
Third Amendment claim. 4 But, in Custer County, the Tenth Circuit
stated that the Framers could not have intended for each property
owner's property to include all of the airspace above their land.
Analogizing to the Fourth Amendment's "legitimate expectation of
privacy" doctrine, the court stated that it is "not reasonable to expect
privacy from the lawful operation of military aircraft in public naviga-
ble airspace," and denied that claim."6 Here, again, the court made
light work of the citizens' claims by taking their argument to an al-
most absurd logical extreme. The plaintiffs did not demand that
every plane flying at any altitude above their homes request
40 U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by
law.").
41 Custer County, 256 F.3d at 1043 (alteration in original). This is the first time that the Third
Amendment, as it applies to the quartering of soldiers, was even judicially interpreted. See Anne
Marie C. Petrey, The Second Circuit Review-1981-1982 Term: Constitutional Law: The Third
Amendment's Protection Against Unwanted Military Intrusion: Engblom v. Carey, 49 BROOK. L. REV.
857, 858 (1983).
42 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982).
43 Id. at 958-61.
Id. at 963-64.
45 Custer County, 256 F.3d at 1043.
46 Id.
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permission to do so; there is a significant difference between planes
flying over homes at 500 feet and at 30,000 feet: the former is exceed-
ingly disruptive, while the latter is not even noticeable.
In Welch v. United States Air Force, twenty-eight property owners in
Texas contested the Air Force's Realistic Bomber Training Initiative
("RBTI") and filed eleven claims for relief against the United States
Air Force and the DoD for trespass, nuisance, and violations of NEPA,
and the Fifth and Third Amendments.4 ' The Third Amendment
claim was summarily dismissed with heavy citations of Custer County
and Engblom: "Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' assertions that the
RBTI overflights will involve 'direct invasion' of Plaintiffs' homes are
without merit and fail to state any cognizable claim. 48 The court also
borrowed the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Causby,49
stating that the modern world cannot use an ancient common law
conception of property that extends to "the periphery of the uni-
verse."5' In the modern world, "the air is a public highway. Private
claims to public airspace 'would clog these highways' .... 'Common
sense revolts at the idea.' 5 1 The court granted the defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss the Third Amendment claim.5 Here, again, the court
erred in dismissing the case by taking legitimate claims (the planes
were flying near the plaintiffs' homes at or near supersonic speeds)
and depicting them as petty. The plaintiffs did not want to stop all
air travel or hoard the skies-they just wanted to be compensated for
that which rendered their homes nearly uninhabitable.
B. The Fifth Amendment
The petitioners in Custer County, described above, also argued that
they were entitled to injunctive relief under the Fifth Amendment
5 3
because the RBTI, by using the airspace above their properties, con-
stituted "'an unauthorized taking of private property without due
47 Welch v. United States Air Force, No. 5:00-CV-392-C, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21081 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 19, 2001).
48 Id. at*21.
49 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
50 Welch, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21081, at *22 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 261); see also Major
Walter S. King, The Fifth Amendment Takings Implications of Air Force Aircraft Overflights and the Air
Installation Compatible Use Zone Program, 43 A.F. L. REV. 197 (1997) (arguing that the Air Force
will have to litigate an increasing number of Fifth Amendment takings claims due to overflights,
because once-remote Air Force bases are now in populated areas).
51 See Welch, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21081, at *23 (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 261) (citations
omitted).
52 Id.
53 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use without just compensation."
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process or the prospect of compensation. "' 5 4 In denying this request,
the court explained that injunctive relief is only available for unau-
thorized takings and that unauthorized conduct is ultra vires-that is,
"action explicitly prohibited or outside the normal scope of agency
responsibilities. '"5 5 The court held that the petitioners' claim could
not stand and held for the military since the military's actions did not
56violate any statutes.
The owners of land in the area of Luke Air Force Base ("Luke")
near Phoenix, Arizona, also filed a Fifth Amendment claim in con-
junction with claims under NEPA and the Federal Aviation Act in
Westside Property Owners v. Schlesinger.5 7 Regarding the takings claim,
the plaintiffs argued that their property values were reduced by Luke
activities such as overflights, and that their communication and en-
joyment inside their homes was diminished by noise pollution and
fear of crashes.58 They sought injunctive and declaratory, but not
monetary, relief.
59
In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit said that this claim would nor-
mally lack jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity.60 The plain-
tiffs tried to claim an exception to the sovereign immunity doctrine
by invoking Washington v. Udall, which held that sovereign immunity
would not necessarily bar a suit if the government engaged in ultra
vires acts.6' The court rejected this argument, finding that the plain-
tiffs' position was not so much that Luke's activities were unauthor-
ized but that they were annoying and harmful to property values. As
62such, sovereign immunity still applied. In a sense, the court was
right: the Air Force is obviously allowed to fly. Yet this is too simple,
because the Air Force was not just flying, it was making it hard for
residents to do simple things like have a conversation, watch televi-
sion, and sleep in their own homes. The Air Force cannot point to
any statute which authorizes it to disrupt the citizens' lives it protects.
Moreover, the court noted an exception to the Washington v. Udall
exception: sovereign immunity can exist, even when the govern-
ment's officers act outside of their statutory authority, if "'the relief
sought would work an intolerable burden on governmental
Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1041-42 (10th Cir. 2001).
5 Id. at 1042.
56 Id.
57 597 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1979).
58 Id. at 1218-19.
59 Id. at 1219.
60 Id. Sovereign immunity is defined as a "government's immunity from being sued in its
own courts without its consent. Congress has waived most of the federal government's sover-
eign immunity." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 654 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1969).
Westside Prop. Owners, 597 F.2d at 1219.
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functions, outweighing any consideration of private harm. In such
cases a party must be denied all judicial relief other than that avail-
able in a possible action for damages. ''6. The Westside plaintiffs
sought an order preventing Luke from operating aircrafts in a way
that would deprive them of the use and enjoyment of their real prop-
erty. 4 The court responded: "Although the cry of 'national defense'
cannot justify Government illegality, we note that appellants' re-
quested relief would impinge upon a serious national matter."65 The
court did not take into account how burdensome the noise pollution
was for the plaintiffs or articulate exactly what "serious national mat-
ter" was at stake.
Citizens' efforts to stop Navy training exercises off the coast of
Puerto Rico is one of the better known actions against the military,
because it has received widespread media attention.66 Since 1941, the
Navy has used Vieques, a small island of fifty-one square miles that is
seven miles off of the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico, as a live im-
pact range for all of its war resources.6 7 Seventy-three percent of the
island's inhabitants live in poverty and there are inexplicably high
rates of cancer. In April 1999, a civilian security guard was killed
and four others were injured by two errant bombs.6
In the case that began the legal struggle in 1979, the plaintiffs, led
by the governor of Puerto Rico, raised a large number of statutor
and constitutional claims under the First70 and Fifth71 Amendments. 72
In addition, a group of fishermen who lived on Vieques intervened• • 73
and introduced their own similar claims. The court did not summa-
rize the plaintiffs' actual arguments for the constitutional claims,
instead it just folded them together and dismissed them both at
63 Id. (quoting Washington v. Udall, 417 F.2d at 1318).
A Id.
65 Id.
66 Mireya Navarro, Uproar Against Navy War Games Unites Puerto Ricans, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1999, at A8.
67 Id.
6 Id.
0 Id.
70 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
71 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation.").
72 Romero-Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979). These statutory claims in-
cluded, but were not limited to, claims under NEPA, CWA, CAA, RCRA, ESA, the Marine Pro-
tection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, the Noise Control Act of 1972, and the Coastal
Zone Management Act. The trial lasted over three months.
73 Id. at 650-51.
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once.7 4  Finding that the Commerce Clause75 grants Congress the
power to issue restrictions upon "certain areas of the surrounding wa-
ters of Vieques, '76 the court held:
Since Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that the above restrictions
are unreasonable, it is unnecessary for this Court to reach Plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment taking claims. Again, however, Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate any property interest of theirs which has been invaded, and
indeed, they have none, particularly since no one has a property interest
capable of being "taken" under the Fifth Amendment, in the fish in the
sea.
Finally, the Plaintiffs... allege that the United States military opera-
tions on the Island of Vieques constitute a denial of freedom of travel as
guaranteed by the First Amendment .... The evidence presented at trial
demonstrates clearly that there is no significant restriction on travel or
on use of the beaches around Vieques ....
The main statutory claim was that the Navy had violated the CWA
by discharging pollution, in this case ordnance, into the water with-
out a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permit. The court held that the Navy had violated the CWA and re-
quired a permit, but finding that the violations were only "technical,"
declined to enjoin the target practice and instead ordered the Navy
to apply for a permit "'with all deliberate speed."
78
Although the plaintiffs appealed the case to the First Circuit and
the Supreme Court, they did not appeal on their First and Fifth
Amendment claims.79 The plaintiffs were not allowed to express
74 The plaintiffs' First Amendment argument provides an interesting counterpoint to the
one articulated by the two defendants in United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126 (1st Cir. 1981). In
Saade, the defendants, who were part of a group of thirty-five people who interrupted a live tar-
get practice with an eleven-boat flotilla, appealed their criminal convictions for unauthorized
entry onto the military danger zone on Vieques during naval gunnery practice. The govern-
ment could not make any arrests on the water because of the weather conditions, but two de-
fendants were recognized and arrested later based on eyewitness accounts. The defendants
made a pre-trial motion to dismiss the case by arguing invidious selective prosecution: the gov-
ernment had singled them out for prosecution "in order to deter their exercise of rights pro-
tected by the first amendment," since one was the president of the Vieques Fishermen's Associa-
tion and the other was the attorney for that group. Id. at 1135. The First Circuit upheld the trial
court's decision to dismiss the motion because the government had a specific reason for arrest-
ing these two defendants that was within the government's discretion, and that the reason had
not been to punish the defendants for past political action or prevent future political action. Id.
at 1136.
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
76 See Romero-Barcelo, 478 F. Supp. at 700.
77 Id. at 701 (citations omitted).
78 Id. at 708 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
79 The cases were appealed in United States v. Puerto Rico, 721 F.2d 832 (1st Cir. 1983), and
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), in which the Court held that the injunctive
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themselves by demonstrating against the government's activities, and
their health and livelihoods were taken away from them by the weap-
ons testing. Yet no matter how much merit these claims theoretically
had, the plaintiffs must have seen that no court, not even the highest
court in the land, would find merit in them, and so chose to appeal
on more pragmatic grounds.
More than twenty litigation-filled years later, the situation on
Vieques has not significantly improved. In 2001, citizen plaintiffs
combined their claims under RCRA and ESA with equal protection
claims, arguing that the DoD chose to conduct its military exercises
on Vieques because of its residents' race and national origin.5 The
defendants argued that such claims were time-barred because they
went to the military's decision, made in the 1940s, to locate the mili-
tary base on Vieques, whereas the statute of limitations was six years."'
The plaintiffs argued that each of the training exercises was a sepa-
rate violation of their equal protection rights for statute of limitations
purposes, not just a continuance of a violation that occurred in the
1940s. s2 The court held that the claims were not barred provided that
they were based on training exercises conducted after the statute of
limitations expired 3 However, when appealing the court's dismissal
of their RCRA claim with prejudice and their ESA claim without
prejudice, the plaintiffs did not include their equal protection claim
in their brief,84 and it was not further considered by the First Circuit.
85
Again, realistically, it would not have done any good.
relief requested by the citizens would cause grievous harm to the Navy and the general welfare
of the nation.
so Water Keeper Alliance v. United States Dep't of Def., 152 F. Supp. 2d 163, 170 (D.P.R.
2001). The opinion states that the claim for denial of the equal protection of the laws is
brought under the Fifth Amendment. The Equal Protection clause is vested in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which provides that the states shall not "deny any person within itsjurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Although technically the Fourteenth
Amendment only applies to the states, the Supreme Court has adopted a "congruence" princi-
ple, interpreting the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause to demand equal protection from
the federal government as well. SeeJESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1137 (9th ed.
2001).
The Vieques plaintiffs argued that the government's action showed more disregard for their
well-being than those who lived elsewhere, because they were Puerto Rican.
s See Water Keeper Alliance, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 170-71.
82 Id. at 171.
83 Id. at 177.
84 SeeWater Keeper Alliance v. United States Dep't of Def., 271 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2001).
85 Id. at 28.
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III. WHY ARE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS REJECTED?
One major reason these citizens lawsuits fail is embodied in the
"political question" doctrine.86 Consider an example from 1971, two
years after Congress passed NEPA, when the modem idea of envi-
ronmental protection was still very new. In McQueary v. Laird, citizen
plaintiffs living in the five-county area of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal
filed a class action lawsuit against the Secretary of Defense and others
for violations of their Fifth and Ninth Amendment ights,8 7 without
invoking any environmental statutes. The complaint challenged the
authority and the care with which the defendants stored chemical
and biological weapons at the arsenal.8 The court dismissed the case
for want of jurisdiction because none of the statutes relied on by the
defendants contained an express waiver of sovereign immunity.90
Furthermore, no exception to sovereign immunity applied in the in-
stant case because the contested actions were within the officers'
statutory authority and were not constitutionally void."
Only during oral arguments (the issue was not briefed) did the
plaintiffs argue that the court's jurisdiction could be based on
NEPA 92 The court refused to find jurisdiction in NEPA for claims
challenging a military facility's effect on human health and safety via
its environmental impacts because there was no precedent for doing
so. 9 The court concluded, "[t]he challenges raised by the appellants
in this case fall within that narrow band of matters wholly committed
to official discretion which, in recognition of the needs involved in
national security, do not blend with tests in an evidentiary hearing."
94
Four years later, the District Court for the District of Columbia
picked up this thread and expanded the political question doctrine
in its application to military infractions of NEPA, in a case regarding
the proposed home port of the Trident submarine called Concerned
About Trident v. Schlesinger.95 The court held that the military had the
discretion to make the substantive decision to build the Trident
86 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (explaining the political question doctrine).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
88 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Nielson v. Seaborg, 348 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Utah
1972) (granting summary judgment to defendant Atomic Energy Commission on the residents'
NEPA claims because nuclear tests were within government's discretion and such discretion was
unreviewable because it raised national security issues).
89 McQueary, 449 F.2d at 609.
90 Id. at 610.
91 Id. (citing Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963)).
92 Id. at 612.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 400 F. Supp. 454 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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because it met the four factors laid out in the Supreme Court's Baker
v. Car96 decision:
There is a "textually demonstrable ... commitment" of the conduct of
national defense to the Congress in Article I, § 8, and the President in
Article II, § 2. Secondly, the courts are not the proper forum for debate
on national security and defense issues. Third, the policy determination
to proceed with a particular approach toward national defense is not
within the ambit of the court's expertise or discretion, and, if so under-
taken, would be a usurpation of the powers of the Congress and the
President who have the duty under the Constitution to develop such
policies. Fourth, in light of ongoing international arms limitation nego-
tiations and the large amounts of money already invested in this particu-
lar national defense program, there exists an unusual need for adher-
ence to the Trident choice.
So, on the one hand, the days of McQueary v. Laird are over: it is clear
that NEPA and other environmental statutes apply to national secu-
rity activities, so much so that courts and litigants now take that fact
for granted.98 On the other hand, the court will often either accept
the military's political question challenge and find that the case is not
justiciable as long as the statute has been roughly complied with, or
find that the violation does not merit the requested relief because the
national security issue at stake is more important than the environ-
mental issue.99 The Concerned About Trident court also comments that
even if national security does not hinge upon the completion of the
project in question, the amount of money already spent weighs heav-
ily against environmental considerations.00 This holding creates a
perverse incentive for the military, or indeed any federal agency, to
96 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
97 Concerned About Trident, 400 F. Supp. at 482.
98 See DYCUS, supra note 1, at 16-17. Dycus explains that two sections of NEPA have "qualify-
ing language" that could give defense activities greater latitude under the statute. Id.; see 42
U.S.C. § 4331(b) (providing that the government "use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy," to comply with the statute); 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(providing that the agency conduct environmental review "to the fullest extent possible").
99 See DYCUS, supra note 1, at 165 (analyzing cases in which the political question doctrine
has been raised); cf United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) ("We can-
not accept the Government's argument that internal security matters are too subtle and com-
plex for judicial evaluation. Courts regularly deal with the most difficult issues of our society.");
Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 427 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding fault with the district
court's failure to balance the "weight of the alleged NEPA violation against the harm the in-
junction would cause the Navy and to this country's defense. The Navy has emphasized that an
ELF submarine communications system .... [I] s essential to the national defense and that any
delay in its construction is contrary to national defense interests."); Romero-Barcelo v. Brown,
478 F. Supp. 646, 708 (D.P.R. 1979) ("[U]nder the present circumstances the continued use of
Vieques by Defendant Navy for naval training activities is essential to the defense of the Nation
and that the enjoining of said activities is not an appropriate relief for the correction of the
cited statutory violations.").
See Concerned About Trident, 400 F. Supp. at 482-83.
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spend massive amounts of money before trying to comply with NEPA,
because once the money is spent the court will consider that fact
when deciding whether to enjoin the project.
Yet whether the court is inclined to give priority to national secu-
rity issues, should not the plaintiffs' invocation of their constitutional
rights merit more judicial attention? Even if the constitutional claims
do not persuade the court to find for the plaintiffs, the courts fail to
give either the citizens or the Constitution any respect in these in-
stances. The cases noted above give these claims short shrift, quickly
dismissing them at the end of the opinions, usually without bothering
to describe the substance of the claims. The courts also do not indi-
cate that a valid constitutional claim could hypothetically be made if
only plaintiffs' counsel was more competent. While there have been
successful citizen suits against the military,' °' there has never been a
prevailing constitutional claim.
Does this summary treatment have more to do with the fact that
the military is a litigant, arguing that national security is at stake, or
with the fact that citizens who interfere in the government's business
by filing citizen suits face a difficult road? A 1980 citizen suit against
the United States Army Corps of Engineers, National Sea Clammers
Ass'n v. New York, 02 provides both an interesting counterpoint to citi-
zen suits against the military establishment and a possible explana-
tion for the fate of constitutional claims that the cases noted above
fail to include. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is part of the
Army, but ninety-seven percent of its personnel are civilian. 0 3 Its pro-
jects include navigation, flood control disaster response, military con-
struction, and support for defense and federal agencies.
10 4
In National Sea Clammers Ass'n, fishermen sued the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers under a number of statutory claims, including the
CWA, the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act, and the
Rivers and Harbors Act, for violations that damaged the seabed off
the New Jersey coast and impaired their ability to make their living.'
0 5
101 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Pirie, 201 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.D.C. 2002) (ordering the
military to conduct its live fire training exercises in compliance with the APA and the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act).
102 616 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1980).
103 United States Army Corps of Engineers Homepage, at http://www.usace.army.mil/
whatwedo/didyouknow.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
104 United States Army Corps of Engineers Homepage, at http://www.usace.army.mil/
who.html#Mission (last modified Aug. 30, 2002).
105 Nat' Sea Clammers Ass'n, 616 F.2d at 1222. This case was heavily criticized in subsequent
decisions, but it provides one of the only examples in which a group of citizen plaintiffs filed
suit against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for violations of environmental statutes that also
included constitutional claims. A number of agencies from all levels of government joined the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as defendants, including the City of New York and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency.
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They also raised constitutional claims under the Fifth, Ninth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. 1°6 The plaintiffs argued that they had a
constitutional right to a pollution-free environment that they could
enforce "by virtue of their special relationship to the environment. " 107
The district court rejected the claims, and the Third Circuit affirmed,
holding that "[i]t is established in this circuit and elsewhere that
there is no constitutional right to a pollution-free environment."
0 8
The plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of their constitutional
claims to the Supreme Court.1 0
This case indicates that the court's dismissal of constitutional
claims in citizen suits against the military may have less to do with na-
tional security (since the Army Corps of Engineers is not actually on
the front lines of any fighting force) than with a narrow reading of
constitutional rights and a strict adherence to legal precedent. More
than twenty years later, there is still no constitutional right to a clean
environment."0 All of the cases above are decided by judges who me-
chanically apply the law: the Third Amendment applies only when
soldiers are sleeping in your bed; the Fifth Amendment applies only
when the Air Force builds an airstrip on your front lawn. If the mili-
tary says they need to do it this way, who are we to question them?
This stagnant treatment of the military and the environment does not
take into account the decades-long accumulation of environmental
damage that must be addressed at some point. Nor does it take into
account the modernization that the other constitutional amendments
have undergone. For instance, the First Amendment accommodates
the Internet, and the Second Amendment accommodates weapons
other than muskets. Perhaps the judiciary may eventually reflect the
current trend of environmentalism that is slowly growing in this
country.
IV. BALANCING THE NEEDS OF THE MILITARY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
If environmental concerns are ever to be given as much weight as
military concerns, current world events suggest that that day is far off.
However, regardless of whether this trade-off between environmental
106 Id. at 1237-38.
107 Id. at 1238.
108 Id.
109 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (vacat-
ing and remanding the Third Circuit's holding).
110 For arguments that there should be a constitutional right to a healthy environment, in-
cluding proposals on how it should be created, seeJanelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a
Healthy Environment: Enforcing Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 185 (2001), and Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a
Healthy Environment in Us and in Our Posterity, 68 Miss. L.J. 565 (1998).
Mar. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
and national security serves citizens, are environmental and military
security really at odds? Stephen Dycus optimistically argues that while
these concepts were once mutually exclusive, that is no longer the
case: "with rare exceptions, we can maintain a strong, effective de-
fense without endangering the public health or destroying our natu-
ral resources.". He lays out a series of steps that can be taken in the
legislative, administrative, financial, diplomatic, and cultural arenas
to solidify this merger between environmental and military inter-
ests."2 Yet, he does not describe what circumstances would create the
"rare exceptions" where environmental sacrifices must be made."'
Writing before September 11, 2001, Dycus could not have imagined
the current period of heightened militarism that so closely followed
the publication of his book in 1996. One imagines that there is less
cause for optimism today, and that the definition of a "rare excep-
tion" is above all a political question. In the same way that the post-
September 11 th world has swallowed up many civil liberties and per-
sonal freedoms in an effort to maintain national security," 4 so too
may environmental protection be increasingly sacrificed. Just as the
courts do not hear the constitutional claims of military prisoners be-
ing held without trials in connection with terrorist attacks, the courts
could continue to disregard the constitutional claims of citizens who
bring environmental citizen suits against the military.
One commentator writing more than ten years before September
11 th expressed his concerns about judicial deference to the military
establishment, quoting Justice Murphy for the propostition that
"' [w] e should not break faith with this Nation's tradition of keeping
military power subservient to civilian authority."' l1 5 In the context of
weapons testing and tort liability, Professor Barry Kellman examines
three cases in which he alleges that the 'Judiciary, notably the
Rehnquist Court, has abdicated its responsibility to review civil mat-
ters involving the military security establishment.""6 The courts can
be convinced of military necessity just because the military says that
I DYCUS, supra note 1, at 185. Tellingly, the author entitles the last chapter of his book "Na-
tional Defense vs. Environmental Protection: 'We Can Have It Both Ways."
112 Id. at 187-94.
11 Dycus does, however, provide the following idea:
If environmental trade-offs must be made in the interest of national security, or if the
environment is to be placed at risk, we want to be informed in advance. We want to be
able to say that the environmental harm was unavoidable, that there were no viable al-
ternatives, and that we planned it that way.
Id. at 11.
'4 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against Terrorism, 5 U. PA.J. CONST.
L. 1 (2002).
115 See Barry Kellman, Judicial Abdication of Military Tort Accountability: But Who Is to Guard the
Guards Themselves?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1597, 1597 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1956)).
116 Id. at 1598.
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the contested program is necessary, without providing substantiation,
or indeed, even having any substantiation. ' 7 Kellman argues that the
judiciary should do just the opposite, subjecting military decisions to
rigorous scrutiny for compliance with the law, particularly to insure
that individuals are not deprived of their constitutional rights.", Spe-
cifically, the author advocates for an adoption of the test advocated
by the Korematsu dissent: the government can only deprive an indi-
vidual of her constitutional rights when a public danger is ""'immedi-
ate, imminent, and impending."'' ' "9 This test is much more appro-
priate than simple military "need" because it sets the bar much
higher.
CONCLUSION
For the short term, it appears that national security will prevail
over environmental security. Such an outcome may be unavoidable,
even reasonable, in the eyes of citizens receiving military protection
from external threats, whether those threats are real or perceived.
However, these same citizens suffer from the loss of environmental
quality that the military protection creates.2 Noise pollution lessens
property values and enjoyment of homes, areas of weapons testing
and increased cancer rates overlap, and the loss of too many species
make some unable to earn a living.
The American environment is a part of this nation's heritage: our
determination to occupy the entire continent shaped our history, our
extraction of its natural resources created our wealth, and its agricul-
tural abundance maintained our health. The environment is part
and parcel of the American way of life, yet the military that protects
our way of life also contributes to its destruction, and is given more
latitude to do so by the courts than any other entity, public or private.
The Pentagon sought and won exemption from several environ-
mental laws in Congress in 2003,121 and its efforts continue in 2004.122
A vice chief of staff for the Army, speaking of the environmental
hoops that the Army must jump through, commented, "We're on a
collision course with our national priorities."2 3 Exhibiting enormous
hubris, he also said, "The Army hosts 170 federally endangered
1"7 Id. at 1600-01.
118 Id. at 1600-02.
11 Id. at 1601 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., dis-
senting) (citations omitted)).
120 SeeDYCUS, supra note 1, at 193.
121 See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, Defense Department Forum Focuses on Environment, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2003, at A28.
122 See, supra note 29, and accompanying text.
123 Id. (quoting GeneralJohn M. Keane).
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species on 94 installations." 24 Until the military realizes that the envi-
ronment hosts them, and not the other way around, the conflict be-
tween the military and the environment will continue, and the envi-
ronment (and America) will continue to lose.
124 Id.
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